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Appellants American Motors Sales Corporation and Jeep 
Corporation ("AMC/Jeep") respectfully submit the following response 
to the arguments presented by Appellee Stephen Whitehead in his 
Petition for Rehearing. 
INTRODUCTION 
In appealing this case to the Utah Supreme Court, AMC/Jeep 
sought reversal of the trial court's judgment on the grounds that 
the trial court made incorrect and prejudicial rulings on questions 
of law and with respect to the admissibility of certain evidence. 
In an opinion filed February 2, 1989, this Court agreed, in 
part, holding that the trial court erred: (1) in limiting 
AMC/Jeep7s cross-examination of plaintiffs' expert witnesses (Slip 
Op. at 7) ; and (2) in excluding significant portions of AMC/Jeep's 
evidence (Slip Op. at 7-11). The Court then concluded as follows: 
Rule 103 of the Utah Rules of Evidence states that 
error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits 
or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the 
party is affected. In the instant case, the trial court 
erroneously excluded evidence offered by defendants. 
That evidence was necessary to rebut the assertions that 
plaintiffs made to establish liability. This error was 
compounded by unduly restricting the scope of defendants' 
cross-examination. Given the conflicting testimony 
presented on this key issue, we cannot say that the 
substantial rights of defendants were not affected by the 
combined effects of the erroneous exclusion of the 
evidence and the limitation of cross-examination. While 
no one error by itself perhaps mandates reversal, the 
cumulative effect of the several errors undermines our 
confidence that defendants were able to present to the 
jury their theory of the case and that a fair trial was 
had. 
We therefore reverse and remand for a new trial. 
Slip Op. at 12. 
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Plaintiff's Petition for Rehearing now contends that this 
Court erred in its decision on the appeal: (1) by applying an 
improper standard of review; and (2) by misunderstanding the 
factual context of the trial court's rulings. Plaintiff asks that 
the Court consider new arguments, raised for the first time in its 
Petition for Rehearing, and change its decision based upon this new 
brief. In the alternative, plaintiff asks the Court for the first 
time to limit reversal to the liability issue only, directing that 
the damage award be held in abeyance and accrue interest pending 
retrial of the liability issue. The focus of Plaintiff's Petition, 
however, is the contention that this Court has assembled a few 
isolated, insubstantial and nonprejudicial errors and improperly 
held that the cumulative effect thereof mandates reversal. 
In fact, this Court: 
(a) clearly articulated the standard found in Rule 103 
of the Utah Rules of Evidence, that error may not be predicated 
upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a 
substantial right of the party is affected; 
(b) determined that the trial court "erroneously excluded 
evidence offered by defendants which was necessary to rebut the 
assertions that plaintiffs made to establish liability/, and 
compounded its error "by unduly restricting the scope of 
defendants' cross-examination"; and 
(c) properly held that "[g]iven the conflicting testimony 
presented on this key issue. we cannot say that the substantial 
rights of defendants were not affected by the combined effects of 
2 
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the erroneous exclusion of the evidence and the limitation of 
cross-examination",., and that "the cumulative effect of the 
several errors undermines our confidence that defendants were able 
to present to the jury their theory of the case and that a fair 
trial was had". 
Plaintiff's Petition for Rehearing should be denied. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIS COURT PROPERLY HELD THAT THE ERRONEOUS EXCLUSION OF 
EVIDENCE OFFERED BY AMC/JEEP TO REBUT PLAINTIFF'S THEORY 
OF LIABILITY AND THE IMPROPER RESTRICTION OF THE SCOPE 
OF AMC/JEEP'S CROSS-EXAMINATION OF PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT 
WITNESSES COMBINED TO REQUIRE REVERSAL OF THE TRIAL 
COURT'S DECISION IN THIS CASE 
In the case of Ivie v. Richardson, 336 P. 2d 781, 787 (Utah 
1959) , this Court reversed and remanded a personal injury case for 
new trial based upon the cumulative effect of several trial court 
errors, stating: 
It is unnecessary and would serve no useful purpose 
for us to decide whether any one of the errors above 
discussed, considered separately, would constitute 
sufficient prejudicial error to require a new trial. The 
question is whether the case was presented to the jury 
in such a manner that it is reasonable to believe there 
was a fair and impartial analysis of the evidence and a 
just verdict. If errors were committed which prevented 
this being done, then a new trial should be granted, 
whether it resulted from one error, or from several 
errors cumulatively. We expressly do not mean to say 
that trivia which would be innocuous in themselves can 
be added together to make sufficient error to result in 
prejudice and reversal. The errors must be real and 
substantial and such as may reasonably be supposed would 
affect the result. However, errors of the latter 
character, which may not by themselves justify a 
reversal, may well, when considered together with others, 
render it clear that a fair trial was not had. In such 
event justice can only be served by the granting of a new 
3 
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trial, absent the errors complained of* It is so 
ordered,.. 
Similarly, in State v. St. Clair, 282 P.2d 323 (Utah 1955), 
the Court stated: 
None of the rulings on evidence, considered singly, 
may seem of any great import. But the defendant is 
nevertheless entitled to have them considered 
cumulatively and as part of the over-all picture in 
determining whether he had a fair opportunity to present 
his defense. 
Id. at 328; and 
The proposition for us to decide here is not whether 
any of the irregularities herein discussed would 
separately have been such as to constitute prejudicial 
error and require a new trial. It is recognized that a 
combination of errors which, when singly considered might 
be thought insufficient to warrant a reversal, might in 
their cumulative effect do so. 
Id. at 332; Accord Moss v. Magnetic Peripherals, Inc., 744 P.2d 
1285, 1288 (Okla. App. 1987). 
Plaintiff's argument that the Court's decision in this case 
"adopts a 'cumulative error doctrine' and overrules, sub silentio# 
prior decisions of this Court to the contrary," is simply 
inaccurate. The case of Bundv v. Deland, 763 P.2d 803 (Utah 1988), 
on which plaintiff principally relies for its argument, merely held 
that the cumulative error standard did not apply in that case 
because there were no substantial errors. Id. at 806. The Court 
expressly recognized, however, the existence of a "cumulative 
error" doctrine in cases where a number of errors prejudice the 
defendant's right to a fair trial. Id. Similarly, in Lamb v. 
Bangart, 525 P.2d 602, 608 (Utah 1974), cited by plaintiff, the 
Court merely found that the errors were insubstantial. 
4 
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The holdings in Richlin v. Gooding Amusement Co. , 113 Ohio 
App. 99, 170 N.E.2d 505, 508 (1960) and Nicholas v. Yellow Cab Co. , 
116 Ohio App. 402, 180 N.E.2d 279, 286 (1962), cited by plaintiff, 
are distinguishable from the present case in that they are 
predicated on the fact that the various errors complained of were 
unrelated to one another. Hess Oil & Chem. Corp. v. Nash, 22 6 Ga. 
706, 177 S.E.2d 70, 72-73 (1970), which relies on the Nicholas 
holding, is further distinguishable in that the appellant did not 
specify cumulative error as a basis for reversal. 
In this case, the Court properly held that: 
1. after permitting plaintiffs to present, through 
their expert witnesses, a theory of liability that the accident 
vehicle (a Jeep Commando) was defective and unreasonably dangerous 
because: 
(a) it was purportedly "substantially similar" to 
the CJ-5; and 
(b) the CJ-5 was purportedly defective because 
certain tests purportedly showed that the 
CJ-5 was more likely to roll over than other 
vehicles, including passenger cars; 
2. the trial court then erroneously: 
(a) cut defendants off during their attempts to 
cross-examine plaintiff's experts, preventing 
defendants from probing the basis of the 
opinions given by plaintiff's experts on 
comparisons they had made in their direct 
5 
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examination, allowing the issues to be 
presented to the jury without the added light 
that thorough cross-examination sheds (Slip 
Op. at 6-7); and 
.(b) excluded defendants' own expert testimony and 
exhibits to rebut the plaintiff's theory of 
liability (Slip Op. at 9-10). 
The Court specifically observed as follows: 
In the instant case, plaintiffs introduced films of 
Jeep CJ-5s rolling. In part I of this opinion, we upheld 
the admissibility of those films because of the 
[purported] substantial similarity of the vehicle shown 
in the films to the vehicle in which plaintiffs were 
injured. However, plaintiffs in presenting their case 
did not stop there. They produced several experts who 
repeatedly in their testimony drew comparisons of the 
rollover tendencies of Jeep vehicles to non-Jeep 
vehicles. Plaintiffs' aim was to show that the Jeep in 
which they were riding was of an unsafe design and had 
a tendency to roll much easier than other vehicles. For 
example, plaintiffs' expert, Mr. Shaw, testified: "There 
is no doubt that this vehicle is much more prone to roll 
over than some others." Likewise, plaintiffs' expert, 
Mr. Noettl, testified that "it was very difficult to turn 
a passenger car over." Finally, Mr. Anderson, another 
of plaintiffs' experts, testified that Jeep vehicles have 
"a delay in the handling response" that is greater than 
S10 Blazers and Chevy Chevettes. Under the rule of law 
relied upon by the dissenting opinion, that evidence of 
the condition of other products is not admissible to 
establish a defect in a particular product, it may be 
questioned whether such comparisons should have been 
admitted because of the lack of similarity. However, 
right or wrong, plaintiffs' experts were allowed to draw 
the comparisons between the rollover propensities of Jeep 
and non-Jeep vehicles. Certainly then, defendants should 
have been allowed in rebuttal to prove the experience of 
plaintiffs' experts and to introduce into evidence the 
film showing non-Jeep vehicles doing mechanically induced 
rollovers similar to those shown in plaintiffs' film... 
Slip Op. at 9-10. 
6 
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Similarly, the Court properly held that: 
1. After receiving expert testimony presented by the 
plaintiff that the accident vehicle was defective at the time it 
left the hands of the manufacturer because its roof collapsed 
during the rollover made the subject of this litigation, thus 
contributing to the plaintiff's injuries; 
2. The trial court erroneously sustained plaintiff's 
objection (on the basis of materiality) to the admissibility of an 
exhibit offered by defendants to show that the accident vehicle had 
been involved in a prior accident that had compromised the 
structural integrity of the vehicle's roof. Slip Op. at 10. 
Finally, the Court properly held that evidence of how the 
presence of seat belts affected the design safety of the vehicle 
was erroneously excluded under the circumstances of this case. 
Slip Op. at 11. 
Contrary to plaintiff's contention in its Petition for 
Rehearing, the aforesaid errors do not constitute isolated, 
insubstantial and nonprejudicial errors. Indeed, as this Court 
properly held: 
Given the conflicting testimony presented on this key 
issue, we cannot say that the substantial rights of 
defendants were not affected by the combined effects of 
the erroneous exclusion of the evidence and the 
limitation of cross-examination. While no one error by 
itself perhaps mandates reversal, the cumulative effect 
of the several errors undermines our confidence that 
defendants were able to present to the jury their theory 
of the case and that a fair trial was had. 
Slip Op. at 12. 
7 
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POINT II 
AMC/JEEP CAREFULLY PRESERVED ITS CLAIMS OF ERROR ARISING 
OUT OF THE EXCLUSION OF ITS EVIDENCE THROUGH PROFFERS 
REFLECTED IN THE RECORD DESIGNATED IN THIS CASE 
Rule 103 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides that "[e]rror 
may not be predicated upon a ruling which...excludes evidence 
unless a substantial right of the party is affected, and... the 
substance of the evidence was made known to the court by offer or 
was apparent from the context within which questions were asked". 
In this case, AMC/Jeep carefully preserved its claims of error 
arising out of the exclusion of its evidence, through proffers 
reflected in the record designated on this appeal, and obviously 
reviewed by the Court in connection with its consideration of this 
appeal. See e.g., Slip Opinion at 7-11. 
POINT III 
THIS COURT CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD THE BASIS FOR THE TRIAL 
COURT'S RULINGS ON THE ADMISSIBILITY OF DEFENDANTS7 
EXHIBITS AND PROPERLY HELD THAT THOSE DETERMINATIONS WERE 
ERRONEOUS 
For the third time on this appeal, Plaintiff has argued to 
this Court that the trial court's erroneous evidentiary rulings 
were actually "sanctions imposed by the trial court as a result of 
AMC/Jeep's failure to make discovery." (Resp. Br. at 11; Motion 
for Summary Disposition; Petition for Rehearing at 9-17) . AMC/Jeep 
responded to those arguments twice prior to the issuance of the 
Courts opinion in this case (See Reply Br. at 4-18; Appellants7 
Response to Motion for Summary Disposition), and this Court's 
opinion demonstrates on its face that those arguments have been 
8 
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carefully reviewed, thoroughly understood, and thoughtfully 
considered. 
Specifically, the Court states in its opinion as follows: 
Defendants also contend that the trial court erred 
in excluding certain films and exhibits offered by them 
as evidence. They called a Mr. Heitzman as an expert 
witness to testify regarding the handling characteristics 
of Jeep vehicles. He offered a film showing CJ-5s 
successfully negotiating emergency maneuvers. Plaintiffs 
objected on the ground that the introduction of the film 
violated previous orders of the court regarding 
discovery. The objection was sustained. 
Plaintiffs had submitted interrogatories seeking any 
testing Jeep had done regarding the handling 
characteristics of the 1966-73 Jeep Commando. At a 
hearing on plaintiffs' motion to compel discovery. Judge 
Sorenson ordered Jeep to respond to the interrogatory 
within thirty days. At trial, after hearing arguments 
in chambers on the admissibility of the film, the court 
ruled: 
I think that in the context of all the 
circumstances and with respect to discovery 
procedures...I think the plaintiffs were 
entitled to have, or see, the films and test 
results before trial pursuant to their 
discovery interrogatories. . . , the films are not 
admissible. 
The trial 
discovery < 
Procedure. 
discovery 
Commando. 
simply is 
court can 
Drders under 
However , 
covered on 
exclude 
rule 37 o 
evidence 
f the Utah 
defendants point 
ly tests 
The film offered 
; not covered 
was 
by 
of the 
of a Jeep < 
that 
Rules 
out 
1966-
CJ-5. 
the lanquaqe 
violates 
of Civil 
that 
-73 
The 
of 
the 
Jeep 
film 
the 
interrogatory. Although plaintiffs7 experts were allowed 
at trial, over objections of defendants, to show films 
of CJ-5s based on their foundational testimony that its 
handling was substantially similar to that of the 
Commando, that ruling does not place the film within the 
scope of material sought in the pretrial discovery 
request. The dissenting opinion would have defendants 
divine the scope of the requests by a trial court ruling 
on the admissibility of evidence which came much later. 
This burden cannot fairly be placed on them. The tests 
were not produced to show the handling of the "66-73 Jeep 
Commando," nor were they offered for that purpose. 
Defendants maintained that the handling of the CJ-5 and 
9 
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the Commando were not the same. The tests were offered 
to rebut evidence presented by plaintiffs that the CJ-5 
was defective because of its handling characteristics. 
Although this evidence could have been excluded on the 
basis of relevancy had the trial court earlier excluded 
plaintiffs' films, once the court allowed plaintiffs to 
try their case on the basis of comparison with the CJ-5, 
it could not then refuse defendants the opportunity to 
rebut assertions made by plaintiffs in the presentation 
of their case. The trial court erred in excluding the 
film on the basis that defendants had failed to comply 
with orders regarding discovery. 
Slip Op. at 7-8. 
This Court held that the trial court's exclusion of Heitzman's 
second film on the basis of relevance was also error (Slip Op. at 
8-10), but sustained the ruling of the trial court with respect to 
Exhibit No. 174, stating: 
The third film that defendants claim was wrongfully 
excluded was offered as exhibit No. 174, a video produced 
by defendants7 expert, Dr. Warner. It consisted of two 
parts...The second part was excluded because the test was 
not made until after the trial had commenced, in 
violation of pretrial orders regarding discovery. 
Counsel for defendants stated that No. 174 was offered 
to show the handling characteristics of the 1972 
Commando. Clearly, it came within the scope of 
plaintiffs7 interrogatories and was properly excluded for 
failure to respond to discovery. 
Plaintiffs nevertheless have petitioned this Court for leave 
to reargue the entire matter again, this time asserting new 
arguments never before presented on this appeal. Petition for 
Rehearing at 9-17. In Lockhart Co. v. Anderson, 646 P. 2d 678, 681 
(Utah 1982) this Court denied a petition for rehearing asserting 
new arguments, unequivocally stating that "fal losing party cannot 
use a petition for rehearing 'to present to this court a new theory 
or contention which was neither in the record as it was before this 
10 
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court nor in the arguments made7", citing Swanson v. Sims, 51 Utah 
485, 498, 170 P. 774, 778 (1918). That ruling is applicable here. 
AMC/Jeep responded fully, or properly objected, to all of 
plaintiff's discovery requests in this litigation. Plaintiff's 
discovery did not request from AMC/Jeep information relating to the 
demonstrative evidence erroneously excluded by the trial court, 
except in the case of rebuttal evidence created during the course 
of the trial and excluded because it was not produced for 
Plaintiffs prior to trial. Furthermore, the Plaintiff never moved 
the trial court for an order under Rule 37, and the trial court 
never granted sanctions against AMC/Jeep for any discovery abuse. 
None of the evidence excluded by the trial court was 
responsive to plaintiff's interrogatories for the simple reason 
that none of this evidence related to the design and development 
of the 1972 Commando. In fact, as this Court observed in its 
opinion, much of it was relevant only as rebuttal evidence on 
issues improperly raised by plaintiffs' presentation of their case-
in-chief. Certainly, plaintiffs have identified no interrogatory 
and no statement by Judge Sorenson which would have required 
AMC/Jeep to produce the evidence subsequently excluded by the trial 
court. 
POINT IV 
THE SUPREME COURT HAS APPLIED THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD 
OF 
OF 
REVIEW 
THE 
WITH 
SCOPE 
RESPECT 
OF 
TO THE 
DEFENDANTS 
TRIAL COURT'S 
' CROSS-
LIMITATION 
-EXAMINATION OF 
PLAINTIFFS EXPERT WITNESSES 
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Plaintiff argues that this Court has applied an inappropriate 
standard of review with respect to the trial court's limitation of 
the scope of defendants' cross-examination of plaintiff's expert 
witnesses in this case, because (1) the Court has left the word 
"clear" out of its statement of the "abuse of discretion" standard, 
and (2) fails to define "abuse of discretion" in this particular 
opinion. Plaintiff's argument is utterly without merit. 
The Court states in Part III of its opinion as follows: 
Defendants next contend that the trial court erred 
in limiting their cross-examination of plaintiffs' expert 
witnesses. While unduly harsh limitation of a key expert 
witness can amount to prejudicial error, the proper scope 
of cross-examination is within the sound discretion of 
the trial court and should not be disturbed absent a 
showing of abuse. State v. Starks, 581 P.2d 1015 (Utah 
1978) ... 
Slip Op. at 4. 
On the face of the opinion, it is clear that the Court is 
relying upon and directly applying the "abuse of discretion" 
standard previously articulated in State v. Starks, and its 
progeny. If that were not the case, the Court would have inserted 
a contrary signal prior to the citation in the opinion. 
More importantly, however, the language used by the Court 
throughout the opinion in this case demonstrates that the Court 
did, in fact, apply the correct standard of review on this issue. 
In the paragraph immediately preceding the one attacked by the 
plaintiff, the Court states as follows: 
Given our standard of review of the admissibility 
of evidence at trial, we cannot clearly say that the 
trial court abused its discretion in admitting 
plaintiffs' films in light of the foundation laid by 
their experts... 
12 
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Slip Op. at 4. Then in the midst of the section discussing the 
propriety of the trial court,s limitation of defendant's cross-
examination of plaintiff's experts, the Court says: 
Contrary to the statement in the dissenting opinion, it is 
clear that by inquiring as to his experience, defendants were 
attempting to probe the expert's credibility and the 
foundation for his testimony that it is difficult to roll a 
passenger car. 
Slip Op. at 6. 
The Court has also defined the standard of review with respect 
to the cross examination of expert witnesses as follows: 
In Chrysler Corp. v. Todorovich, 580 P.2d 1123 (Wyo. 1978), 
the Wyoming court held that it was prejudicial error to refuse 
to allow cross-examination regarding a critical aspect of the 
plaintiff's proof. There the court stated: 
Having offered his expert opinion, the witness 
exposes himself to interrogation which 
ordinarily would have no place in the cross-
examination of a factual witness, but the 
expert exposes himself to the most searching 
kind of investigation into his qualifications, 
the extent of his knowledge and the reasons for 
his opinion, including the facts and other 
matters upon which it is based. 
Id. at 1133. 
Slip Op. at 4. 
Finally, the Court concludes that: 
An assertion or opinion given on direct testimony that 
bears on a key issue in the case is a proper subject of 
cross-examination. While the trial court's attempt to 
avoid confusion of the issues and a long and cumbersome 
trial is understandable, defendants were entitled to 
conduct cross-examination into the basis of the opinions 
offered by plaintiffs' expert witnesses and to probe the 
comparisons they had made on direct examination. 
Here defendants were repeatedly cut off during their 
attempts to cross-examine plaintiffs' experts. The 
numerous objections of plaintiffs' counsel, many of which 
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were improperly sustained, prevented defendants from 
probing the basis of opinions given by plaintiffs' 
experts on comparisons they had made in their direct 
examination. As a result, the issues were presented to 
the jury without the added light that thorough cross-
examination sheds. We find therefore that the trial 
court erred in limiting defendants' cross-examination of 
plaintiffs' expert witnesses. The trial court did not 
limit those experts to comparisons to utility vehicles 
on their direct examination. Hence cross-examination 
should not have been so restricted. 
Slip Op. at 6-7. 
Plaintiff next argues that the comparisons made by its expert 
witnesses in this case between Jeeps and other vehicles were not 
really a critical aspect of the plaintiff's proof on the liability 
issues. Petition for Rehearing at 23. The Record in this case 
demonstrates otherwise, however. As the Court notes: 
In the instant case, plaintiffs introduced films of 
Jeep CJ-5s rolling. In part I of this opinion, we upheld 
the admissibility of those films because of the 
[purported] substantial similarity of the vehicle shown 
in the films to the vehicle in which plaintiffs were 
injured. However, plaintiffs in presenting their case 
did not stop there. They produced several experts who 
repeatedly in their testimony drew comparisons of the 
rollover tendencies of Jeep vehicles to non-Jeep 
vehicles. Plaintiffs' aim was to show that the Jeep in 
which they were riding was of an unsafe design and had 
a tendency to roll much easier than other vehicles. For 
example, plaintiffs' expert, Mr. Shaw, testified: "There 
is no doubt that this vehicle is much more prone to roll 
over than some others." Likewise, plaintiffs' expert, 
Mr. Noettl, testified that " it was very difficult to 
turn a passenger car over." Finally, Mr. Anderson, 
another of plaintiffs' experts, testified that Jeep 
vehicles have "a delay in the handling response" that is 
greater than S10 Blazers and Chevy Chevettes. Under the 
rule of law relied upon by the dissenting opinion, that 
evidence of the condition of other products is not 
admissible to establish a defect in a particular product, 
it may be questioned whether such comparisons should have 
been admitted because of the lack of similarity. 
However, right or wrong, plaintiffs' experts were allowed 
to draw the comparisons between the rollover propensities 
of Jeep and non-Jeep vehicles. Certainly, then, 
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defendants should have been allowed in rebuttal to prove 
the experience of plaintiffs' experts and to introduce 
into evidence the film showing non-Jeep vehicles doing 
mechanically induced rollovers similar to those shown in 
plaintiffs' film... 
Slip Op, at 9-10. 
This Court's holding that the trial court impermissibly 
limited the scope of defendants' cross-examination of plaintiff's 
expert witnesses, is also unassailable on the independent basis of 
"curative admissibility", discussed in AMC/Jeep's opening brief on 
this appeal. See App. Br. at 44, n.5, and 50-53. Barnson v. 
Squibb, 682 P.2d 832 (Utah 1984); Mills v. Memphis Sales 
Manufacturing Co., 251 F. Supp. 458, 460 (N.D. Miss. 1966). 
POINT V 
FINALLY, THIS COURT MUST REJECT PLAINTIFF'S NEW REQUEST 
IN THE PETITION FOR REHEARING THAT THE REVERSAL OF THIS 
CASE BE LIMITED TO THE LIABILITY ISSUES ONLY AND THAT THE 
DAMAGE AWARD BE PERMITTED TO ACCRUE INTEREST PENDING 
RETRIAL OF THE LIABILITY ISSUES 
In Hvland v. St. Marias, 427 P.2d 736, 738 (Utah 1967), this 
Court stated that 
[t]here are undoubtedly some instances where limiting a 
trial to the issue of damages only may be justified, as 
our rules allow. But courts generally do not look with 
favor upon such a restriction. The reasons why this is 
so in personal injury actions are well exemplified in 
this case. The questions relating to the plaintiff's 
injury, how it happened, who was at fault, and the pain 
and injury occasioned thereby, are so intermingled that 
if there is to be a new trial, in fairness to both 
parties it should be on all issues. 
Similarly, in Groen v. Tri-0, 667 P.2d 598 (Utah 1983), this 
Court determined that the new trial in a personal injury action 
should be on liability and damages. As here, one party claimed 
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that because the jury had made a finding on the amount of damages, 
only liability should be retried. The Court stated in a footnote, 
however, that "[w]hether such a finding should be reopened in 
connection with a new trial on the issue of liability depends on 
whether the two issues are so intermingled that fairness to both 
parties requires retrial on both." Cf Nelson v. Truiillo, 657 P. 2d 
730, 735 (Utah 1982). Without explanation the Court determined 
that the retrial should involve damages as well as liability. 667 
P.2d at 607, n. 11. 
The Oregon Supreme Courts decision in Maxwell v. Portland 
Terminal RR Co., 456 P.2d 484, 486 (Or 1969) is also persuasive: 
In the ordinary two-party personal-injury case, ... 
evidence of fault can influence the jury's measurement 
of damages; and the kind and degree of injuries may 
influence some jurors in their evaluation of the evidence 
on liability...Whatever logical problems these elements 
of lawyer folklore may suggest, we believe that neither 
side in this type of case should be encouraged to 
manipulate errors in one trial to gain advantage in a new 
trial before a new jury. Accordingly, we hold that the 
new trial in a personal injury case ordinarily should be 
a new trial on all contested factual issues, regardless 
of the ability of the parties on appeal to pinpoint error 
so as to show that the error, if any, may have affected 
only one issue. There will, of course, be exceptional 
cases in which the trial court, in the exercise of 
judicial discretion, properly will limit the issues for 
a new trial. But the standard to be applied in the 
exercise of this discretion is reasonable certainty that 
the issue or issues to be eliminated from the second 
trial are no longer viable issues in the case and that 
their removal will not prejudice the right of either 
party to the kind of jury trial to which he would have 
been entitled but for the error or errors necessitating 
the new trial. 
And the Colorado Supreme Court points out in Bassett v. 
O'Dell, 498 P.2d 1134, 1135 (Colo 1972) that: 
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[i]t is also clear that a partial retrial could not be 
conducted without injustice, since it would be virtually 
impossible under the facts of this case to mask the first 
jury's verdict for the plaintiff from the new jury that 
would be sitting at the time the case is retried. The 
prejudicial inference that would be created by a limited 
remand is to us obvious, 
"A claim for damages arising out of a personal injury is 
unliquidated in the sense that the defendant cannot know, prior to 
judgment, the precise amount he is going to be required to pay. 
Therefore, courts, in the absence of an applicable statute, apply 
the general rule for unliquidated claims and do not allow interest 
as a part of the damages awarded in such an action." 22 Am Jur 2d 
Damages § 667. 
In Utah, of course, "special damages" arising in personal 
injury actions accrue interest from the occurrence of the act 
giving rise to a cause of action, under and pursuant to the 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-44. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court's decision reversing and remanding this case for new 
trial is correct. Plaintiff's Petition for Rehearing must, 
therefore, be denied. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 4th day of April, 1989. 
KIMBALL, PARR, CROCKETT & WADDOUPS 
by-^^^^f JK^#l*W64^ 
Patricia W. Christensen 
Attorneys for Appellants 
American Motors Sales Corporation 
Jeep Corporation 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
Stephen Whitehead and 
Deborah Whitehead, 
Plaintiffs and Appellee, 
No. 19695 
F I L E D 
February 2, 
v. 
American Motors Sales Corporation 
and Jeep Corporation, Larry Anderson, 
Variable Annuity Life Insurance 
Company, 
Defendants and Appellants. Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
Fourth District, Utah County 
The Honorable J. Robert Bullock 
Attorneys: C. Keith Rooker, Patricia W. Christensen, Thomas 
B. Green, Salt Lake City, for Appellants 
Jackson Howard, Richard B. Johnson, Provo, 
for Appellee 
HOWE, Associate Chief Justice: 
Defendants American Motors Sales Corporation and 
Jeep Corporation (AMC/Jeep) appeal a judgment awarded 
plaintiff Stephen Whitehead on a products licibility claim. 
On October 16, 1979, Deborah Whitehead was driving 
south on 1-15 near Orem, Utah, in a 1972 Jeep Commando that 
she had borrowed from her father. Her husband, Stephen, 
was riding in the passenger seat. Defendant Larry Anderson 
was returning home from work in his automobile, a short 
distance behind the Whiteheads. The Oldsmobile station 
wagon he was driving was traveling approximately fifteen 
miles per hour faster than the Commando. The Oldsmobile 
struck the Commando on the left rear corner; the Commando 
went out of control and rolled. Stephen Whitehead suffered 
a spinal injury and was rendered a paraplegic. 
Plaintiffs Deborah and Stephen Whitehead filed 
their original complaint on November 21, 1979, naming 
Anderson as defendant. The complaint was later amended, 
adding Anderson's employer, Variable Annuity Life Insurance 
Company,1 and AMC and Jeep as defendants. 
1^ Variable Annuity Life Insurance has filed a separate 
appeal on the issue of vicarious liability. See Whitehead v. 
Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co,, No. 19645, decided also 
today. 
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During the nearly four years between the filing of 
the original complaint and the beginning of trial, the 
parties engaged in extensive discovery. Plaintiffs 
propounded three sets of interrogatories to AMC/Jeep, 
Their failure to timely answer the interrogatories brought 
motions by plaintiffs to compel discovery. AMC/Jeep's 
answers, when received, prompted a motion to strike as 
unresponsive and additional motions to compel discovery by 
plaintiffs. A hearing on those motions was held on 
October 29, 1982, where Judge Sorensen2 went through the 
interrogatories and answers. He modified some of the 
questions, gave orders for supplemental answers to be 
given, and stated that if the answers stood as given, he 
would sustain objections to evidence not conforming with 
the answers. Plaintiffs orally asked for sanctions against 
AMC/Jeep for failure to cooperate in discovery. While no 
formal motion was made and no order for sanctions was ever 
issued, plaintiffs did file a motion in limine after the 
supplemental answers were filed seeking to prohibit 
AMC/Jeep from introducing evidence pertaining to the 
subjects of certain interrogatories. The court reserved 
ruling on the motion until the evidence was offered. 
Plaintiffs also filed a motion in limine on 
October 7, 1983, regarding the admissibility of a film 
produced by Dynamic Science that showed Jeep CJ-5s rolling 
over in staged tests. Upon a prescreeninng of the film and 
over AMC/Jeep's objection, the judge ruled that the film 
was admissible. Plaintiffs also moved to exclude all 
evidence as to the availability and their nonuse of seat 
belts. After reviewing memoranda of the parties and 
proffers of proof, the court barred references to the 
availability or nonuse of seat belts. 
American Motors Sales Corporation filed its answer 
to the complaint in September 1983, over three years after 
being named in the amended complaint and just one month 
prior to the trial* It raised Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-3(1) 
(1987) as a defense. This statute bars the bringing of a 
products liability action "more than six years after the 
date of initial purchase for use or consumption." Jeep 
Corporation moved to amend its answer to also include this 
defense; the motion was denied. 
Trial commenced on October 19, 1983, and continued 
for three weeks. The jury determined that AMC and Jeep 
were negligent in the design of the vehicle and awarded 
damages to Stephen Whitehead. AMC and Jeep appeal, raising 
several issues which we will separately consider. 
2~. Judge Sorensen, after hearing most of the pretrial 
matters, retired and did not preside at the trial. 
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I. 
Defendants contend that they should have been 
allowed to interpose a defense based on Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-15-3 (1987), which provides that product liability 
actions are barred if brought "more than six years after the 
initial purchase," In Berry ex rel. Berry v. Beech Aircraft, 
717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985), we held that statute to be 
unconstitutional; therefore, defendants' point is moot* 
II. 
Defendants contend that the court erred in admitting 
plaintiffs' films of Jeep CJ-5s. In reviewing questions of 
admissibility of evidence at trial, deference is given to the 
trial court's advantageous position; thus, that court's 
rulings regarding admissibility will not be overturned absent 
an abuse of discretion. Bullock v> Ungricht, 538 P.2d 190, 
192 (Utah 1975); Shipp v. General Motors Corp., 750 F.2d 418 
(5th Cir. 1985) ; see also Collins v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 558 
F.2d 908 (8th Cir. 1977). 
The criteria for establishing the admissibility of 
crash test films, such as those in issue here, are that the 
data be relevant, that the tests be conducted under conditions 
substantially similar to those of the actual occurrence, and 
that its presentation not consume undue amounts of time, not 
confuse the issues, and not mislead the jury. Endicott v. 
Nissan Motor Corp., 73 Cal. App. 3d 917, 141 Cal. Rptr. 95 
(1977) ; Culpepper v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 33 Cal. 
App. 3d 510, 109 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1973); Jackson v. Fletcher, 
647 F.2d 1020 (10th Cir. 1981); Renfro Hosiery Mills Co. v. 
United Cash Register Co., 552 F.2d 1061 (4th Cir. 1977); see 
Weaver v. Ford Motor Co., 382 F. Supp. 1068 (E.D. Pa. 1974), 
aff'd, 515 F.2d 506, 507 (3d Cir. 1975) (without published 
opinion) ; see also Collins v. B.F. Goodrich, 558 F.2d at 910. 
Defendants objected to admission of tests of GJ-5s 
on the basis that the CJ-5 has a 20-inch shorter wheelbase, 
giving it different steering and handling characteristics 
than the Commando. Defendant also objected on grounds that 
the tests were not substantially similar to the accident 
conditions. The tests were "J turns" where 588 degrees of 
steering were suddenly input while a constant vehicle speed 
was maintained. The test vehicles had also been "specially 
prepared" to accentuate the rollovers depicted in the films. 
The requirement of "substantial similarity of conditions" 
does not require absolute identity; however, they must "be so 
nearly the same in substantial particulars as to afford a 
fair comparison in respect to the particular issue to which 
the test is directed." Illinois Central Gulf R.R. v. Ishee, 
317 So. 2d 923, 926 (Miss. 1975) (emphasis added). The films 
here were offered to show the handling characteristics of the 
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Jeep Commando. Plaintiffs7 experts testified at length that 
the handling characteristics of the CJ-5s shown in the tests 
and the Commando were substantially similar. Defendants by 
cross-examination and presentation of their own evidence 
endeavored to bring out the differences between the test and 
the accident and between the vehicle tested and the vehicle 
in question. 
Given our standard of review of the admissibility of 
evidence at trial, we cannot clearly say that the trial court 
abused its discretion in admitting plaintiffs' films in light 
of the foundation laid by their experts. As the trial court 
stated in admitting the films, any differences between the 
tests and the accident here would go to the weight the jury 
would give the evidence. Jones v. Stemco Mfg. Co., 624 P.2d 
1044, 1046 (Okla. 1981); see Lopez v. Allen, 96 Idaho 866, 
871, 538 P.2d 1170, 1175 (1975). 
III. 
Defendants next contend that the trial court erred 
in limiting their cross-examination of plaintiffs' expert 
witnesses. While unduly harsh limitation of a key expert 
witness can amount to prejudicial error, the proper scope of 
cross-examination is within the sound discretion of the trial 
court and should not be disturbed absent a showing of abuse. 
State v. Starks, 581 P.2d 1015 (Utah 1978); State v. 
Anderson, 27 Utah 2d 276, 495 P.2d 804 (1972); State v. Fox, 
22 Utah 2d 211, 450 P.2d 987 (1969); N.V. Maatschappij v. 
A.O. Smith Corp., 590 F.2d 415, 421 (2d Cir. 1978). In 
Chrysler Corp. v. Todorovich, 580 P.2d 1123 (Wyo. 1978), the 
Wyoming court held that it was prejudical error to refuse to 
allow cross-examination regarding a critical aspect of 
plaintiff's proof. There the court stated: 
Having offered his expert opinion, the 
witness exposes himself to interrogation 
which ordinarily would have no place in the 
cross-examination of a factual witness, but 
the expert exposes himself to the most 
searching kind of investigation into his 
qualifications, the extent of his knowledge 
and the reasons for his opinion, including 
the facts and other matters upon which it is 
based* 
Id. at 1133. 
Defendants contend that there were several instances 
where the trial court's limiting of cross-examination 
prevented them from examining the basis of opinions offered by 
plaintiffs' experts. In his direct testimony, plaintiffs' 
expert, Mr. Anderson, testified that the Jeep Commando was 
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defective because its track width was narrow and its center of 
gravity high, making it easily susceptible to rollovers. He 
also testified concerning the handling characteristics of 
Blazers, Chevy Chevettes, and CJ-7s. On cross-examination, he 
was asked: 
Q: Are there other vehicles that have the 
same track width? 
Mr. Howard [plaintiffs' counsel]: Object. 
Repetitious and irrelevant. 
Court: Sustained on the grounds it's 
irrelevant. 
Q: Are there other vehicles that have about 
the same center of gravity? 
Mr. Howard: Objection. It's irrelevant. 
Court: Sustained. 
Q: If you drive a three-quarter-ton pickup, 
is it the same as driving a Honda 
Accord; handling, steering? 
Mr. Howard: Objection. It's irrelevant. 
Court: Sustained. 
Q: . . . [T]ake another vehicle that has 
wider track width and lower center of 
gravity, can it be rolled on a level 
surface with driver [steering] input? 
Mr. Howard: Objection. It's irrelevant. 
Court: Sustained. 
Defendants contend that not allowing them to cross-examine 
Anderson with regard to characteristics of other vehicles and 
how they would react under the conditions depicted in 
plaintiffs' film left unchallenged the assertions that track 
width and center of gravity are the essential characteristics 
in determining a vehicle's rollover susceptibility and that 
Jeeps are more dangerous than ''other vehicles" because their 
track width is narrower and their center of gravity higher. 
Mr. Anderson had been allowed to compare Jeeps with other 
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vehicles, including the Chevy Chevette, which, contrary to the 
thesis of the dissenting opinion, is not a utility vehicle. 
Defendant should have been allowed to probe the comparisons 
Anderson made. 
In testifying for plaintiff, Mr. Noettl, another 
expert witness, testified: "It was very difficult to turn a 
passenger car over." On cross-examination, he was asked the 
basis of this opinion. 
Q: What experience have you had in trying 
to rollover [sic] a passenger vehicle? 
Mr. Johnson: Object on the basis of 
relevancy. 
Court: I don't want to get into testing all 
other kinds of vehicles, because we've 
got enough problems with the one. So, 
I'm going to sustain the objection. 
Contrary to the statement in the dissenting opinion, it is 
clear that by inquiring as to his experience, defendants were 
attempting to probe the expert's credibility and the 
foundation for his testimony that it is difficult to roll a 
passenger car. 
On recross-examination, Mr. Noettl was also asked: 
Q: I think we were talking about what you 
would expect to happen to the Commando 
or any other vehicle that's hit under 
the circumstances you have been 
describing. 
A: Yes. 
Q: And do you feel that any vehicle would 
come out of that situation unscathed, 
basically? 
Plaintiffs objection to this question was also sustained. 
An assertion or opinion given on direct testimony 
that bears on a key issue in the case is a proper subject of 
cross-examination. While the trial court's attempt to avoid 
confusion of the issues and a long and cumbersome trial is 
understandable, defendants were entitled to conduct cross-
examination into the basis of the opinions offered by 
plaintiffs' expert witnesses and to probe the comparisons they 
had made on direct examination. 
Here defendants were repeatedly cut off during their 
attempts to cross-examine plaintiffs' experts. The numerous 
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objections of plaintiffs' counsel, many of which were 
improperly sustained, prevented defendants from probing the 
basis of opinions given by plaintiffs7 experts on comparisons 
they had made in their direct examination. As a result, the 
issues were presented to the jury without the added light that 
thorough cross-examination sheds. We find therefore that the 
trial court erred in limiting defendants7 cross-examination of 
plaintiffs7 expert witnesses• The trial court did not limit 
those experts to comparisons to utility vehicles on their 
direct examination. Hence cross-examination should not have 
been so restricted. 
IV. 
Defendants also contend that the trial court erred in 
excluding certain films and exhibits offered by them as 
evidence. They called a Mr. Heitzman as an expert witness to 
testify regarding the handling characteristics of Jeep 
vehicles. He offered a film showing CJ-5s successfully 
negotiating emergency maneuvers. Plaintiffs objected on the 
ground that the introduction of the film violated previous 
orders of the court regarding discovery. The objection was 
sustained. 
Plaintiffs had submitted interrogatories seeking any 
testing Jeep had done regarding the handling characteristics 
of the 1966-73 Jeep Commando. At a hearing on plaintiffs7 
motion to compel discovery, Judge Sorenson ordered Jeep to 
respond to the interrogatory within thirty days. At trial, 
after hearing arguments in chambers on the admissibility of 
the film, the court ruled: 
I think that in the context of all the 
circumstances and with respect to discovery 
procedures . . . I think the plaintiffs were 
entitled to have, or see, the films and test 
results before trial pursuant to their 
discovery interrogatories . . . , the films 
are not admissible. 
The trial court can exclude evidence that violates discovery 
orders under rule 37 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
However, defendants point out that the discovery covered only 
tests of the 1966-73 Jeep Commando. The film offered was of a 
Jeep CJ-5. The film simply is not covered by the language of 
the interrogatory* Although plaintiffs7 experts were allowed 
at trial, over objections of defendants, to show films of 
CJ-5s based on their foundational testimony that its handling 
was substantially similar to that of the Commando, that ruling 
does not place the film within the scope of material sought in 
the pretrial discovery request. The dissenting opinion would 
have defendants divine the scope of the requests by a trial 
court ruling on the admissibility of evidence which came much 
7 No. 19695 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
} 
later. This burden cannot fairly be placed on them. The 
tests were not produced to show the handling of the "66-73 
Jeep Commando," nor were they offered for that purpose. 
Defendants maintained that the handling of the GJ-5 and the 
Commando were not the same. The tests were offered to rebut 
evidence presented by plaintiffs that the GJ-5 was defective 
because of its handling characteristics. Although this 
evidence could have been excluded on the basis of relevancy 
had the trial court earlier excluded plaintiffs' films^ once 
the court allowed plaintiffs to try their case on the basis of 
comparison with the GJ-5, it could not then refuse defendants 
the opportunity to rebut assertions made by plaintiffs in the 
presentation of their case. The trial court erred in 
excluding the film on the basis that defendants had failed to 
comply with orders regarding discovery. ^ 
Defendants offered a second film in conjunction with 
Heitzman,s testimony. This film showed non-Jeep vehicles 
doing mechanically induced rollovers similar to those shown in 
plaintiffs7 film. After excluding defendants' first film for 
failure to produce it in discovery, the trial court ruled that 
this second film was not admissible, stating: 
Now, the other one rests on a different 
principle, I think. And the question that I 
have there is, the relevancy of it and 
whatever else you might want to raise. 
The evidence was offered to rebut the tests shown on 
plaintiffs7 films and to demonstrate that there was no design 
defect in the Commando because virtually any vehicle would 
roll when subjected to such tests. 
We have no quarrel with the rule of law relied upon 
in the dissenting opinion that "evidence of the condition of 
other products is irrelevant and not admissible to establish a 
defect in a particular product." This is a sound rule when 
properly applied as it was in the cases cited in the 
dissenting opinion. For example, in Clark v. Detroit & 
Mackinac Ry., 197 Mich. 489, 163 N.W. 964 (1917), a rowboat 
rented from the defendant capsized, causing four minors to 
drown. The Michigan court held that it was error to attempt 
to prove the unseaworthiness of the capsized boat by admitting 
evidence of the various conditions of repair of the other 
boats kept for hire by the defendant. 
Similarly, in Detroit, T.& I. R.R. v. Banning, 173 
F.2d 752 (6th Cir.), cert, denied, 338 U.S. 815 (1949), also 
cited in the dissenting opinion, the plaintiff, a railroad 
brakeman, was injured while making a flying switch. He 
brought suit against his employer railroad, contending that 
the boxcar in which he was riding and which he was required to 
slow down by applying a hand brake had been pushed too fast by 
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the engine, making it impossible for him to adequately slow 
down the boxcar, which was to couple with a standing car- At 
trial, plaintiff was allowed to testify that although he had 
previously made twenty-five to thirty flying switches, none of 
them were made at a rate of speed as high as the one in which 
he was injured. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals 
held that it was error to have admitted the plaintiff's 
testimony. Said the court: 
No foundation was laid to show the 
circumstances, distance, grade or other 
conditions of such previous operations. 
We believe the testimony was improperly 
admitted. Several factors can affect the 
speed at the time of impact, variable 
under different operations, irrespective 
of the initial speed given to the free 
rolling cars. It is a well-established 
rule of evidence that circumstances under 
which other comparable conduct occurs 
should be substantially similar. Wigmore 
on Evidence, 3d ed., vol. II, §§ 459, 460 
[and citing other cases]. 
Banning, 173 F.2d at 756. 
In the instant case, plaintiffs introduced films of 
Jeep CJ-5s rolling. In part I of this opinion, we upheld the 
admissibility of those films because of the substantial 
similarity of the vehicle shown in the films to the vehicle 
in which plaintiffs were injured. However, plaintiffs in 
presenting their case did not stop there. They produced 
several experts who repeatedly in their testimony drew 
comparisons of the rollover tendencies of Jeep vehicles to 
non-Jeep vehicles. Plaintiffs' aim was to show that the Jeep 
in which they were riding was of an unsafe design and had a 
tendency to roll much easier than other vehicles. For 
example, plaintiffs' expert, Mr. Shaw, testified: "There is 
no doubt that this vehicle is much more prone to roll over 
than some others." Likewise, plaintiffs' expert, Mr. Noettl, 
testified that "it was very difficult to turn a passenger car 
over." Finally, Mr. Anderson, another of plaintiffs' 
experts, testified that Jeep vehicles have "a delay in the 
handling response" that is greater than S10 Blazers and Chevy 
Chevettes. Under the rule of law relied upon by the 
dissenting opinion, that evidence of the condition of other 
products is not admissible to establish a defect in a 
particular product, it may be questioned whether such 
comparisons should have been admitted because of the lack of 
similarity. However, right or wrong, plaintiffs' experts 
were allowed to draw the comparisons between the rollover 
propensities of Jeep and non-Jeep vehicles. Certainly then, 
defendants should have been allowed in rebuttal to prove the 
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experience of plaintiffs' experts and to introduce into 
evidence the film showing non-Jeep vehicles doing 
mechanically induced rollovers similar to those shown in 
plaintiffs' film. This situation is wholly different from 
the situations in the two above cases relied upon in the 
dissenting opinion where the plaintiff was not allowed to 
make comparisons when the circumstances were dissimilar. 
The third film that defendants claim was wrongfully 
excluded was offered as exhibit No. 174, a video produced by 
defendants' expert, Dr. Warner. It consisted of two parts: 
the first showed a 1972 Jeep Commando conducting a drive-
through of the accident scene, and the second showed the same 
vehicle with outriggers attached doing maneuvers in a parking 
lot. The trial court ruled that the first part of the film 
was not probative of any issue. We agree. The second part 
was excluded because the test was not made until after the 
trial had commenced, in violation of pretrial orders 
regarding discovery. Counsel for defendants stated that 
No. 174 was offered to show the handling characteristics of 
the 1972 Commando. Clearly, it came within the scope of 
plaintiffs' interrogatories and was properly excluded for 
failure to respond to discovery. 
In conjunction with exhibit No. 174, the trial court 
viewed a film of a 1970 Ford in a rollover test (exhibit 
No. 175). Defendants offered No. 175 to demonstrate the 
movement of vehicle occupants during a rollover. The trial 
court determined that the film was not probative and excluded 
it. The film was dissimilar to the accident, was not 
necessary to rebut amy evidence offered by plaintiffs, and 
was not probative of any disputed issue. There was therefore 
no error in the exclusion of defendants' exhibit No. 175. 
Defendants' expert, Dr. Warner, offered exhibit 
No. 130, a storyboard, to illustrate his testimony that the 
vehicle in question had been involved in a prior accident 
that compromised the structural integrity of the roof. 
Plaintiffs' counsel objected, claiming that the exhibit was 
not material. The trial court sustained the objection. 
Plaintiffs' experts had testified that the roof of the 
vehicle was defectively designed, thus contributing to 
plaintiffs' injuries. Evidence illustrating how the roof had 
been damaged in a prior accident was relevant to rebut this 
assertion. The trial court erred in sustaining plaintiffs' 
objection to exhibit No. 130. 
Defendants also offered exhibit No. 164, a series of 
five photographs showing live models posed in a static 
vehicle to represent passenger movement in a rollover. This 
was offered to illustrate the testimony of Dr. Warner that 
the movement of the passengers, not the design of the 
vehicle, caused the injuries. The trial court initially 
No. 19695 10 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
./ .) 
admitted and then excluded the exhibit, stating: 
The probative value is limited at least 
because of the photographs not being 
representative of just what did happen to 
the vehicles . . • or the people in them. 
While it is not clear whether the basis of the trial court's 
ruling was relevance, Utah R. Evid. 401, or that the probative 
value was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, etc., Utah R. Evid. 403, we will 
uphold the trial court's ruling where there is any valid basis 
to do so. State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313, 1316 (Utah 1986). 
Here the trial court could have properly excluded the evidence 
under either theory; therefore, we find no error in the 
exclusion of exhibit No. 164. 
-- V. 
Defendants also contend that the trial court erred in 
excluding all references to the availability of seatbelts and 
plaintiffs7 failure to use them. Plaintiffs made a motion in 
limine to exclude all evidence of seatbelts. The trial court 
excluded such evidence, stating: 
[T]o speculate what the seatbelt might have 
done in this type of situation is just 
something that the jury ought not to, and 
they will not have, under my ruling, the 
obligation to consider. . . . I want no 
more evidence in this case with regard to 
seatbelts. 
Defendants contend that the evidence of seatbelts was relevant 
and necessary to show (1) that their presence was a factor the 
jury should consider when determining if the vehicle was 
unsafe as designed, and (2) that plaintiffs' injuries could 
have been prevented or lessened by the use of seatbelts and 
therefore the jury should be allowed to determine whether 
plaintiffs' duty of ordinary care or their duty to mitigate 
damages required them to wear seatbelts. 
We agree that evidence of how the presence of 
seatbelts affected the design safety of the vehicle should be 
admitted. However, the bulk of defendants' proffered evidence 
and the main thrust of their argument regarding seatbelts was 
directed at plaintiffs' failure to use them as constituting 
contributory negligence or failure to mitigate damages. The 
majority of the cases cited in the briefs submitted to this 
Court have rejected this approach. See Kopischke v. First 
Continental Corp., 187 Mont. 471, 610 P.2d 668 (1980) (for 
citations to other jurisdictions which have rejected this 
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Code Ann. § 41-6-186 (1988), which provides: 
The failure to wear a seat belt does not 
constitute contributory or comparative 
negligence and may not be introduced as 
evidence in any civil litigation on the 
issue of injuries or on the issue of 
mitigation of damages. 
Although this statute was passed subsequent to the litigation 
sub judice and was therefore not controlling at trial, we 
nonetheless decline to place ourselves in the awkward position 
of adopting a stance that is in direct contravention of 
express legislation. We therefore find that the trial court 
did not err in excluding evidence that the failure to use 
seatbelts constituted contributory negligence or failure to 
mitigate damages. 
VI. 
Rule 103 of the Utah Rules of Evidence states that 
error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or 
excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is 
affected. In the instant case, the trial court erroneously 
excluded evidence offered by defendants. That evidence was 
necessary to rebut the assertions that plaintiffs made to 
establish liability. This error was compounded by unduly 
restricting the scope of defendants' cross-examination. Given 
the conflicting testimony presented on this key issue, we 
cannot say that the substantial rights of defendants were not 
affected by the combined effects of the erroneous exclusion of 
the evidence and the limitation of cross-examination. While 
no one error by itself perhaps mandates reversal, the 
cumulative effect of the several errors undermines our 
confidence that defendants were able to present to the jury 
their theory of the case and that a fair trial was had. 
"W^theref ore^ireverse" a:hdfr^and^for^a^new^trial^ 
WE CONCUR: 
Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice 
Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice 
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STEWART, Justice: (Dissenting) 
After a two- and one-half-week trial which produced 
some 5,000 pages of transcript, a verdict was returned for 
plaintiff Stephen Whitehead for damages produced by the tragic 
and permanent injuries suffered in the rollover of a Jeep 
Commando. The Court reverses the jury verdict and judgment on 
the basis of a few evidentiary rulings culled from a host of 
such rulings. The Court holds that the trial court erred in 
(1) limiting defendants' cross-examination, and (2) excluding 
defendants' films. I submit that the trial court was clearly 
correct and that, in any event, the rulings fall within a 
trial judge's discretion. For these reasons, I dissent. 
I. LIMITATIONS OF DEFENDANTS' CROSS-EXAMINATION 
The majority holds that the trial court improperly 
limited defendants' cross-examination of plaintiffs' experts. 
The majority cites three instances in which the trial court 
"cut off" defendants' attempts to cross-examine plaintiffs' 
experts and which prevented defendants from probing the basis 
of opinions given by plaintiffs' experts. 
This Court has long held that the trial court has 
considerable discretion in determining whether evidence is 
relevant. Bambrough v. Bethers, 552 P.2d 1286 (Utah 1976). 
The judgment of the trial court in admitting or excluding 
evidence should not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion, 
and only when the error is prejudicial. State v. Miller, 727 
P.2d 203 (Utah 1986); State v. McClain, 706 P.2d 603 (Utah 
1985); Terry v. Zion's Coop. Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314 
(Utah 1979). Generally, evidence of the condition of other 
products is irrelevant and not admissible to establish a 
defect in a particular product. See Detroit, T. & I. R.R. v. 
Banning, 173 F.2d 752, 756 (6th Cir.)/ cert, denied, 338 U.S. 
815 (1949); Clark v. Detroit & M. Ry», 197 Mich. 489, 503, 163 
N.W. 964, 968 (1917); 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence § 302, at 348 
(1967); 32 C.J.S. Evidence § 583, at 712 (1964). Thus, it is 
irrelevant whether the Jeep Commando was unreasonably 
dangerous compared with other makes or models of automobiles 
generally. The only relevant inquiry is the turnover 
characteristics of the Jeep Commando and other vehicles 
substantially similar to it.1 
1. The majority opinion concedes that only films showing 
accidents of a similar nature are admissible and that the 
trial court correctly excluded one of defendants' films on 
this basis. However, the majority appears to reject the 
proposition that the scope of both direct and 
cross-examination may be properly limited to similar 
vehicles. 
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In this case, the trial judge did not abuse his 
discretion by ruling that the scope of cross-examination would 
include only comparisons of vehicles with the same or similar 
characteristics as the Jeep Commando. The court, during the 
course of the trial, reminded defendants' counsel that only 
evidence of similar vehicles would be admitted: 
The Court: I don't think I've prohibited 
any kind of cross examination with 
reference to vehicles that had the 
same or similar characteristics; 
to-wit: center of gravity and wheel 
width, that Jeep has. 
Mr. Mandlebaum [attorney for defendant 
AMC/Jeep]: Well, I may be 
incorrect. But I believe you have, 
your Honor. I thought the Court's 
ruling was that we could not compare 
other vehicles. 
The Court: No. The only ruling that I 
have made with regard to that, at 
least, at least that's my intent, was 
that unless the vehicles were 
similar, that I wasn't going to 
permit you to compare them in order 
to show that other vehicles might be 
as dangerous as this vehicle. 
The majority now holds that the trial court's 
limitations on cross-examination interfered with defendants' 
ability to attack the foundation of the opinions of 
plaintiffs' expert witnesses. Defendant was allowed, however, 
to introduce such evidence when it was intended to go to 
credibility, as shown below. 
The majority cites three examples of the trial 
court's limitation of AMC/Jeep's cross-examination. The 
examples cited do not prove that there was a limitation of 
cross-examination as to any "critical aspect of plaintiffs' 
proof." In light of the trial court's ruling that only 
evidence of vehicles with the same or substantially similar 
characteristics would be admissible, evidence of other 
non-similar types of vehicles was inadmissible absent some 
special relevancy. 
Every ruling criticized by the majority was in fact 
required by the court's pretrial ruling, yet the majority does 
not even discuss the validity of that ruling. Indeed, the 
majority's view of this case would allow defendants to delve 
into the rollover characteristics of every single type of 
four-wheeled passenger vehicle on the road. Such a ruling 
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would have made it virtually impossible to try this case* It 
is, of course, self-evident that all four-wheeled vehicles can 
be rolled over. Whether a vehicle is defectively designed 
depends upon whether the vehicle is dangerous when used under 
the ordinary conditions of its intended use. That should be 
determined by examining vehicles that are designed for similar 
purposes, i.e., utility vehicles in this case, as the trial 
judge ruled. In my view, the majority undermines the trial 
judge's ability to manage a case such as this by permitting 
defendant to explore on cross-examination matters of highly 
attenuated relevancy. 
The majority's first example of limitation of 
cross-examination arises out of plaintiffs' expert's testimony 
on direct examination concerning the "handling characteristics 
of Blazers, Chevy Chevettes, and CJ-7S." On direct 
examination, the expert stated: 
Q: And what type of handling and 
maneuvering tests did you perform 
last week? 
A: Well, I had some instrument tests 
that I performed on four different 
vehicles. I had a CJ-5, a CJ-7, a 
small Blazer, the new F10 [sic] size 
Blazer, and the Chevy Chevette. 
Q: And what did the results show in 
regard to your tests on the Jeep 
itself? 
A: Well, all the results are 
preliminary. I don't have all the 
data reduced yet. But my preliminary 
quick look at that data indicates 
that the Jeep vehicles both overturn 
at speeds of 20 to 25 miles an hour, 
and they both have a delay in the 
handling response that's in the 
magnitude of a half a second before 
the vehicle is stabilized to turn. 
The other vehicles I tested, the S10 
Blazer and the Chevy Chevette, they 
did not have delays of that 
magnitude. They were much less. 
The majority cites the following, which occurred in the 
context of the above testimony, as a limitation of 
cross-examination: 
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Q: Are there other vehicles that have 
the same track width— 
Mr, Howard [plaintiffs' counsel]: 
Object. Repetitious and irrelevant* 
Court: Sustained on the grounds it's 
irrelevant. 
Q: Are there other vehicles that have 
about the same center of gravity? 
Mr. Howard: Objection. It's irrelevant. 
Court: Sustained. 
Q: If you drive a three-quarter-ton 
pickup, is it the same as driving a 
Honda Accord; handling, steering? 
Mr. Howard: Objection. It's irrelevant. 
Court: Sustained. 
Q: [T]ake another vehicle that has wider 
track width and lower [center of 
gravity], can it be rolled on a level 
surface with driver [steering] 
input? 
Mr. Howard: Objection. It's irrelevant. 
Court: Sustained. 
Defendants' attempted cross-examination of plaintiffs' expert 
went far beyond the scope of the trial judge's order limiting 
the evidence and also beyond the scope of direct examination. 
There was no testimony on direct concerning the rollover 
propensities, track width, or center of gravity of "other 
vehicles" in general. The only testimony given on direct 
examination related to the "handling response" time of the 
CJ-5, CJ-7, S10 Blazer, and Chevy Chevette, all of which are 
utility vehicles having general characteristics substantially 
similar to the Jeep Commando. I submit that the trial court 
did not err in limiting cross-examination. 
The second example cited by the majority of improper 
limitation of cross-examination occurred in the following 
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exchange on defendants' cross-examination of plaintiffs' 
expert: 
Q: What experience have you had in 
trying to roll over a passenger 
vehicle? 
Mr* Johnson [plaintiffs' counsel]: 
Object on the basis of relevancy. 
Court: I don't want to get into testing 
all other kinds of vehicles, because 
we've got enough problems with the 
one. So, I'm going to sustain the 
objection. 
The cross-examination question above was based on an 
assumption made by plaintiffs' expert and found in the 
following direct examination: 
Q: When you started out with this 
particular test, did you know exactly 
what speeds and what input it would 
take to turn the CJ-5 over? 
A: No, absolutely. It was just the 
opposite. That the belief was, that 
since it was very difficult to turn a 
passenger car over, especially on a 
flat surface at low speeds, that it 
would be difficult to do this with a 
Jeep, too. 
As is evident from the above, plaintiffs' expert did not 
purport to have experience in testing or researching the 
rollover propensities of "passenger cars/ nor did he claim to 
have experience in rolling vehicles other than the CJ-5. He 
clearly stated that he started with the belief that since it 
was difficult to roll a passenger car, it would also be 
difficult to roll a CJ-5. The testimony on direct examination 
only made passing reference to "passenger cars." The focus of 
the examination clearly was not on the rollover propensity of 
passenger cars, and the trial judge was clearly within the 
ambit of reasonable discretion in sustaining the objection on 
cross-examination. 
Nevertheless, after sustaining the objection as to 
"passenger cars," the court allowed defendant AMC to 
cross-examine about "utility vehicles" because of their 
substantial similarity to the CJ-5 and the Jeep Commando: 
Mr. Jensen [attorney for defendants]: 
What about the vehicles similar to 
17 No. 19695 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the CJ-5; that is utility vehicles? 
The Scout, Landcruiser, and that 
class of vehicles? The small 
pickups, narrow and with equivalent 
center of gravity? 
Mr. Johnson [plaintiffs/ counsel]: 
Object on the basis of relevance and 
foundation. Outside the scope of 
direct. 
The Court: What is the relevance? 
Mr. Jensen: Similar vehicles, Your 
Honor. 
The Court: The same width, the same — 
Mr. Jensen: Similar track width and 
center of gravity. 
The Court: You may answer. 
Thus, there was no limitation on cross-examination about 
substantially similar vehicles. 
The majority's third example of an improper 
limitation of cross-examination, if read in context, reveals 
that the judge sustained an objection that went only to the 
form of the question. Since a question that is barred because 
of its form may always be rephrased, and since defendants' 
question was not rephrased, it simply is not true that the 
trial court limited cross-examination in this instance. In 
the following testimony, the focus of cross-examination was on 
a direct, straight-on rear-end collision to a vehicle without 
any lateral forces: 
Q: So would you expect that vehicle to 
stay on the road? 
At Again, under a hypothetical thing 
where you just have an impact from 
the rear, no lateral forces are put 
in, yes, it will stay right on the 
road. 
Q: No problem at all staying on the 
road? 
A: No problem at all. 
Q: The driver just rides it out and no 
problem? 
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A: Under those conditions I described, 
yes. If you have no lateral forces 
acting on the vehicle, [no] side 
forces, the vehicle isn't going to 
turn over, 
Q: All right. That would apply whether 
it's a Commando or some other 
vehicle? 
A: In my opinion, that's correct. 
Q: All right. And what distance would 
it take for a driver to get that 
vehicle under control, and could he 
do it within the width of three lanes 
of the freeway? 
Mr. Johnson: Outside the scope, Your 
Honor. We object to it. Secondly, 
the facts of this case are clearly 
lateral force. The evidence at this 
point is uncontroverted that six 
inches, the Oldsmobile hit six inches 
of the Jeep on a specific corner. We 
don't have a direct back input. 
The Court: I'm going to take an afternoon 
recess at this time. I'll overrule 
your objection with respect to it not 
being within the scope of the direct 
examination. But I will sustain it 
with regard to the form of the 
question. And when we come back you 
may go from there. 
Q [By Mr. Jensen]: Thank you, Your 
Honor. 
I think we were talking about what 
you would expect to happen to the 
Commando or any vehicle that's hit 
under the circumstances that you have 
been describing? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And do you feel like any vehicle 
would come out of that situation 
unscathed, basically? 
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Mr- Johnson: Your Honor, the Court 
sustained the objection as to the 
form of the question. 
The Court: And I'll sustain the objection 
to that question. 
Besides asking about the effect of a direct rear impact 
without lateral forces, the question was ambiguous and too 
broad and, at the least, should have been restated. The trial 
court acted well within its discretion, and in any event, the 
incident is unimportant to the outcome of the trial. 
In fact, full cross-examination of plaintiffs' 
experts' qualifications and experience was allowed.2 For 
example, Mr. Jensen, counsel for AMC/Jeep, cross-examined 
Mr. Noettl, plaintiffs' expert, on his knowledge of vehicle 
rollover literature. Mr. Noettl identified various tests, 
reports, and studies concerning vehicle rollover thresholds 
and vehicle characteristics. Overruling plaintiffs' objection 
to a question concerning the rollover propensity of big 
trucks, the court stated: 
Overruled. It may or may not be. I have 
2. On a related point, the majority accepts AMC's contention 
that 
not allowing them to cross-examine 
Anderson with regard to characteristics of 
other vehicles and how they would react 
under the conditions depicted in 
plaintiffs' film left unchallenged the 
assertions that track width and center of 
gravity were the essential characteristics 
in determining a vehicle's rollover 
susceptibility and that Jeeps were more 
dangerous than other vehicles because 
their track width was narrower and their 
center of gravity higher. 
That is not correct. Defendants elicited such evidence from 
its own expert witness, Edward Heitzman. Heitzman testified 
at length concerning the factors that determine the 
susceptibility to rollover of vehicles in general. Heitzman 
testified about numerous other vehicles (including both 
utility vehicles and passenger cars) which have a center of 
gravity equal to or higher than the Jeep Commando. Heitzman 
also testified extensively about the static stability ratio, 
which was relied on by plaintiffs' experts, to determine a 
vehicle's propensity to roll over. In fact, Heitzman had a 
list of vehicles with their static stability ratios which 
formed the basis for his testimony regarding the comparison of 
the Jeep with other vehicles. After extensive discussion, the 
list itself was admitted into evidence. 
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not changed my ruling with respect to 
other matters, in permitting him to go 
into this* This may have something to do 
with credibility, veracity, accuracy, or 
whatever. 
The cross-examination of Mr. Anderson, another of plaintiffs' 
experts, also demonstrates that defendants were not prevented 
from questioning an expert about his experience and 
qualifications. 
This Court has ruled that counsel should make clear 
to the trial judge the relevance of cross-examination 
questions when an objection is sustained on relevancy 
grounds. State v. Miller, 727 P.2d 203, 205 (Utah 1986). See 
also State v. Barella, 714 P.2d 287, 288 (Utah 1986). In none 
of the present instances where the majority rules that the 
trial court improperly sustained plaintiffs' objections to 
questions regarding other vehicles did defense counsel state 
the relevance of those questions. Absent an explanation of 
the relevance of the line of inquiry, exclusion was properly 
called for under the pretrial ruling, which certainly was 
within the discretion of the court. If, indeed, the point was 
to attack the foundation of the expert's opinion—and not to 
confuse the substantive issue of determining whether the 
Commando was defective—that should have been explained to the 
trial court. Otherwise, the trial court was certainly 
entitled to assume that defendants sought to circumvent the 
judge's ruling on relevancy. 
II. EXCLUSION OF FILMS 
The trial court's decision to exclude defendants' 
test films was also clearly within its discretion. One film 
portrayed non-Jeep vehicles performing mechanically induced 
rollovers in a manner somewhat similar to those shown in 
plaintiffs' film. The court ruled: 
[I]t's irrelevant, and it's irrelevant 
because they involve other vehicles which 
the jury would have to take into 
consideration as to how it was done, the 
comparisons, the whole works. 
And the other witnesses have seen the 
Jeep film. And I've let him testify with 
regard to his version of those tests with 
regard to the Jeep. I kept out the other 
because I thought they were irrelevant on 
the issue as to whether or not the Jeep 
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was defectively designed, and I still 
think it is. 
Because each of those tests are — 
they have a — they're not all exactly the 
same. You don't even have the same 
vehicle. And we'd have to determine the 
reliability of the tests for each 
individual car or automobile. And I'm not 
going to let the jury do that. 
Defendants argued before the trial court that plaintiffs had 
at least three different tests or films in evidence showing 
different vehicles making different maneuvers/ all of which 
involved different steering inputs at different speeds. The 
judge responded that those tests and films were admitted 
because expert testimony established that the vehicles 
depicted in the films were substantially the same as the Jeep 
Commando involved in this case: 
The Court: That's the only reason. The 
rest of them were out. And I'm going to 
keep them all out. 
The majority holds that because plaintiffs' experts 
were allowed to draw the comparisons between the rollover 
propensities of Jeep and non-Jeep vehicles, defendants should 
also have been allowed to introduce a film of non-Jeep 
vehicles doing mechanically induced rollovers. As stated 
earlier, evidence of the condition of other products is 
generally not admissible to prove a defect in a particular 
product. See Banning, 173 F.2d at 756; Clark, 197 Mich, at 
503, 163 N.W. at 968; 29 Am. Jur. Evidence § 302; 32 C.J.S. 
Evidence § 583. Such evidence is admissible, however, when 
the products are substantially similar. There is no evidence 
that defendants' film showed vehicles which were substantially 
similar. Plaintiffs' film, however, was of vehicles 
substantially similar to the Jeep Commando. 
In addition, the majority rules that the trial court 
erred in excluding defendants' film of a Jeep CJ-5 on the 
basis that it violated a discovery order directing defendants 
to answer an interrogatory that would have disclosed the 
existence of the film. The majority states: "[Djefendants 
point out that the discovery covered only tests of the 1966-73 
Jeep Commando. The film offered was of a Jeep CJ-5. The film 
simply is not covered by the language of the interrogatory.'' 
I submit the majority is simply in error in stating that the 
interrogatory did not cover the film. The interrogatory 
directed defendants to "state whether Jeep Corporation or 
Kaiser Jeep Corporation tested for or otherwise determined the 
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handling characteristics and qualities of said automobiles 
[Commandos] both during the development and subsequently to 
the initial production • . . ." 
The interrogatory specifically requested information 
as to all tests, even those subsequent to production, to 
determine the handling characteristics and qualities of the 
Commando. Defendants7 tests of the Jeep CJ-5 were, in fact, 
used to determine the handling characteristics and qualities 
of the Jeep Commando, contrary to the assertion of the 
majority that the films were not offered for the purpose of 
showing the handling of the '66-73 Commando. The CJ-5 was 
shown by foundational testimony to be substantially similar to 
the Jeep Commando. A vehicle is substantially similar only if 
it has substantially the same characteristics and qualities. 
The interrogatory requested information concerning not only 
the subsequent testing of Commandos, but also the testing for, 
or otherwise determining, the characteristics or qualities of 
the Commando. Such testing included the CJ-5 because it had 
many of the same characteristics and qualities of a Commando. 
Otherwise, the CJ-5 film would have been irrelevant to 
defendants7 case and inadmissible.3 
The majority claims, however, that defendants were 
forced to "divine the scope of the requests by a trial court 
ruling on the admissibility of evidence which came much 
later." Defendants were instructed, weeks before trial, that 
they could cross-examine but were "not to bring up new facts 
which were not given plaintiffs7 counsel in their response to 
interrogatories." Given the purpose of submitting the CJ-5 
film—to show the characteristics of the Commando—defendants 
had prior notice and should not be able to influence the 
outcome of this long and difficult case by surprise. The 
tests of the CJ-5 clearly fell within the scope of the 
interrogatory in question. The trial court properly excluded 
the test film on the ground that defendants failed to comply 
with discovery orders based on that interrogatory. See 
Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Donahue, 674 P.2d 1276, 1284-85 
(Wyo. 1983) (exclusion of defendants7 rollover film for 
violation of discovery order was within broad discretion of 
trial court). 
Finally, the majority opinion states that it was 
improper for the trial court to exclude exhibit No. 130, a 
storyboard illustrating defendants7 expert7s testimony "that 
the vehicle in question had been involved in a prior accident 
that compromised the structural integrity of the roof." This 
3. Defendants claim now on appeal that "[i]t was a film made 
in 1983 of a Jeep CJ-5 and had nothing to do with the 1972 
Commando." (Emphasis in original.) If that is true, we 
should affirm the trial court7s order on grounds of 
irrelevancy. 
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question goes more to damages rather than liability. Its 
admissibility turned on a whole host of variables. 
Determination of admissibility is in the trial judge's 
discretion. 
Durham, Justice, concurs in the dissenting opinion of 
Justice Stewart. 
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